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INDIVIDUAL AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE ACT OF GENOCIDE 
 
Not every act of mass killing constitutes genocide. 
Genocide is the notion created by the theory of law. It was first used 
by Rafał Lemkin, a lawyer of a Polish-Jewish origin, who emigrated to the 
US at the beginning of the World War II.
1
 This theoretical notion became 
the term of law in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide.
2
 
To be qualified as genocide a crime should be perpetrated with the 
special intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group. 
In various internal regulations, such as the Polish one, mass killing is 
treated as genocide also if a group of victims was determined by the political 
criteria or because its members represent the special worldview (compare art. 
118 of the Polish Criminal Code of 1997). 
These additional criteria, existing in the Polish criminal legislature, 
have their historical source in the position of the Soviet Union during 
preparatory works to the convention on genocide. The representatives of 
the Soviet Union, already during work on the convention, suggested 
adoption of a criterion of a political character of a group, justifying 
treatment of mass killing of its members as genocide. Supposedly, the 
reason was killing by Germans during the war, on the Soviet territory, 
these members of the Red Army who were identified as political officers 
(people’s commissioners3). They were shot on the spot just like the 
soldiers qualified as Jews, and not taken into captivity like the rest. This, 
obviously, was a political criterion. 
As far as a criterion of a specific worldview existing in a Polish 
legislature is concerned, it is difficult to relate to the intention of the 
legislator. In a Polish judicature this criterion has never been used. 
Supposedly, it could be applied to the cases of mass killing of the members 
of a group defined by professing no religion. 
                                                 
1
R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 1944.  
2
 Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December 1948, 
entry into force 12 January 1951.  
3
 S. Datner, Zbrodnie Wehrmachtu na jeńcach wojennych w II wojnie światowej, War-
szawa 1961, s. 100 – 102. 
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According to definition used in the Convention a crime of genocide 
may be committed by the act of: 
– Killing members of the group; 
– Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
– Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
– Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
– Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
The act may have a form of: 
– Genocide (itself); 
– Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
– Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
– Attempt to commit genocide; 
– Complicity in genocide. 
The term ‘genocide’ occurred in an indictment1 but it did not occur in 
the judgment of the International Military Tribunal in the Nuremberg Trial.
2
 
The Constitution of the International Military Tribunal in its Part II 
(Jurisdiction and General Principles) defines crimes coming within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for which there shall be individual 
responsibility. These are the following crimes: 
1. crimes against peace; 
2. war crimes; 
3. crimes against humanity. 
The definition of the third group was, namely: murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions of political, 
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
The fourth crime was conspiracy. Leaders, organizers, instigators and 
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plan. Even the participation in 
conspiracy constituted only the individual responsibility of persons. 
                                                 
1
 Indictment. Count Three – war crimes. VIII (A) “They conducted deliberate and system-
atic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian 
populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes 
of people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies 
and others.” 
2
 The trial of the major Nazi Germany war criminals held between 20 November 1945 and 
1 October 1946 
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The London Agreement (August 8
th
 1945) in its article 1 stated that the 
war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location may 
be accused individually or in their capacity as members of the organizations 
or groups or in both capacities. 
The indictment was brought against persons and groups of persons 
(institutions) such as follows: 
 
– Reich Cabinet (die Reichsregierung)1; 
 
– Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party (das Korps der Politischen 
Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei)
2
; 
 
– SS3 and SD4; 
 
– Gestapo5; 
 
– SA6; 
 
– General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces7. 
 
The indictment of the defined groups exercising power in Germany 
during the war period should be considered as a first step towards state 
responsibility (non-individual one) although the aim of the applied 
construction was to enable to subsequently bring the persons belonging to the 
groups considered as criminal, due to their affiliation to the criminal group, to 
a trial before a criminal court. 
The liability rules established at Nuremberg in relation to the crimes 
against humanity, from among which a crime of genocide was distinguished, 
are applied until now, not only in the internal law of the states but also by the 
contemporarily functioning international criminal courts, namely: 
 
                                                 
1
 Members of ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, members of the Council of Minis-
ters for the Defense of the Reich, Members of the Secret Cabinet Council. 
2
 Political leaders of any grade or rank e.g. the leaders of the various  functional offices of 
the Party as well as the territorial leaders. 
3
 The entire corps of the SS and all offices, departments, services, agencies, formations, 
organizations and groups of which it was at any time comprised or which were at any time 
integrated in it. 
4
 Sicherheitsdienst des ReichsFuehrers-SS 
5
 Geheimeme Staatspolizei – any headquarters, departments etc existing after 30 January 
1933. 
6
 Die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP under the immediate jurisdiction of  the Fuehrer. 
7
 The individuals who between February 1938 and May 1945 were the highest command-
ers of the Wehrmacht, the Army, the Navy and the Air Forces of Germany. 
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International Criminal Court
1
, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia
2
, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
3
, 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia
4
. 
In the jurisprudence of these courts there are many examples of the 
interpretation of the terms connected with genocide. The ICTY formulated 
a relevant thesis
5
 that a group may be defined negatively by defining 
victims as persons not belonging to the group to which the perpetrators of 
the felony claim their affiliation, justified by the possession of the specific 
national, ethnical, racial or religious features (e.g. Bosnian Serb). A group 
defined by exclusion (everyone who is not a Bosnian Serb) is also 
protected by the Convention. 
Genocide (as a crime committed by an individual) is now commonly 
recognized as international crime (delictum iuris gentium), which because of 
its international importance must be punished and punishable through 
international cooperation (universal repression principle). The defendant 
should be liable not only before the court of the country where the crime was 
committed but also before the court of the country where he or she is 
apprehended, in case of escape. 
The definition of genocide in the Rome Statute and in the statutes of 
other contemporary international criminal courts is exactly the same as the 
definition contained in the Genocide Convention. 
The responsibility of the States in which the policy of genocide took 
place is independent from the responsibility of individuals. 
The state responsibility for grave breaches of the international law may 
be enforced on the basis of the UN Charter. 
First possible measures taken  by the international community 
towards a state on whose territory the acts of mass murder are committed 
is to bring a case before the International Court of Justice which may 
deliver an advisory opinion in regard of the occurance of the politics of 
genocide in an accused country. The Security Council of the United 
Nations Organization may ask for such opinion or a state where the case 
                                                 
1
 Established by multilateral treaty (Rome Statute), entered into force 1 July 2002 
2
 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991 (ICTY), established 1993 (Security Council Resolution 827). 
3
 ICTR established 1994 (Security Council Resolution 955). 
4
 ECCC established by the agreement between the Cambodian government and the United 
Nations in 2003. 
5
 A judgement delivered in the case regarding Goran Jelisic. 
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happened may submit the petition to International Court of Justice with 
such an accusation.
1
 
A legal basis for such type of action is the Charter of the United 
Nations which in its art. 2 (6) allows taking actions also towards states which 
are not members of the UN. 
The International Court of Justice, after declaring a violation of the 
international law, may impose on a state an obligation to pay damages (art. 
36 Statute of the International Court of Justice). 
A second instrument is a possibility to take up a humanitarian 
intervention against the will of a state committing on its territory acts of 
genocide (or other grave breaches of international law). Art. 41 and 42 of the 
UN Charter constitute a legal basis to take up a humanitarian intervention. 
The third possible measure  is called Responsibility to Protect. This 
has three pillars approach: 
Pillar one stresses that the State itself has the primary 
responsibility to protect the population from genocide, war crime s, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; pillar two addresses the 
commitment of the international community to provide assistance to 
State to protect their population from genocide, war crimes etc; pillar 
three focuses on the responsibility of international community to take 
timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes and the crimes against humanity when a State is 
manifestly failing to protect its population. 
A state which committed acts of genocide or other international crimes 
may voluntarily or under constraint (e.g. in an act ending an armed conflict) 
make an obligation to pay damages to the victims (descendants of the 
victims) or to the state on whose territory such felonies took place.
2
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there has been only one single case 
in history when a state had to bear real consequences for genocide organized 
                                                 
1
 E.g. In 1999 the Republic of Croatia  instituted the proceeding before the International 
Court of Justice against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for violation of Genocide 
Convention in Knin region, Slavonia and Dalmatia. In February 2007 International Court 
of Justice rendered the judgment in case Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montene-
gro. The court found that Serbia violated the obligation under the Genocide convention to 
prevent genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995. The verdict was that “Serbia shall immedi-
ately take effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligations  under the Geno-
cide Convention to punish acts of genocide (…) and to transfer  individuals accused of 
genocide or any of those other acts for trial by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and to co-operate fully with the Tribunal.” 
2
 E.g. In 1952 in Luxembourg Israel concluded a bilateral agreement with the Federal Re-
public of Germany regarding payment of the individual damages to the victims of the ra-
cial repressions or to their descendants. 
34 
 
on a state level. Namely, the end of the World War II terminated the 
existence of the German statehood by means of putting the German territory 
under the authority of the victorious powers and the Allied Control Council 
of Germany. It was a real punishment for the international crimes, including 
crimes of genocide, applied by means of force. 
Shall we be satisfied with such state of affairs? It seems that the 
international community achieved success in the area of enforcing the 
individual responsibility for the crime of genocide. However, the possibility 
of enforcing the state responsibility is still extremely difficult. 
Such cases as a slaughter of the Armenians in Turkey with over a 
million of victims (1915 – 1917), hunger in Ukraine (Holodomor) with a 
14 million estimated number of victims (1932-1933), a case of a 
slaughter of over 10 thousand Polish officers in  Katyń (1940 ), although 
admitted by Russia, still haven’t brought any punishment of the 
perpetrators. 
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TOMN IN CRISIS 
 
THE SPIRIT OF TOWN 
Bytom is one of the oldest towns in Poland . It received city rights in 
the 13
th
 century, so it is over 750 years old. Its architecture is beautiful, 
and the culture is really rich. Bytom is situated  in Silesia, the largest 
mining region in Poland. Its coal mining cultural heritage is diverse, and 
its traditions have lasted for over a few generations. In 1945 the city was 
transferred to Poland after the Potsdam Conference. At that time its 
German population was largely deported and replaced with inhabitants of 
eastern provinces annexed by the Soviets. They were mostly inhabitants 
of Lvov, a city with a well-integrated community, famous for its special 
atmosphere of kindness, cheerfulness, an open attitude to others, and also 
great traditions and achievements in culture and science. Thus Bytom 
witnessed the encounter of two communities – Silesians, who felt a very 
strong connection to this land, who are also a community of kind people 
and ready to help those in need (towns with mining industry know the 
meaning of hard work and crisis situations related to mini ng, they are 
ready to support one another), and the inhabitants of Lvov, who, even 
though did not have any mining traditions, possessed a similar mentality 
and ability to live in a local community; they also appreciated its value. 
In this way, despite the difficult historical circumstances, the both groups 
